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ABSTRACT
COVID-19 has spread globally, and most countries have adopted extraordinary measures to 
mitigate its effects on public health. These include bringing part of economic activity to a standstill 
and the confinement of the population, and they are exerting a most severe contractionary effect 
on GDP and employment worldwide. While the resolute action of national and supranational 
authorities will contribute to alleviating these effects, their magnitude remains, for the moment, 
highly uncertain. 
This article develops a set of scenarios for the Spanish economy that consider various alternative 
assumptions about the duration of the confinement and the persistence of the shock the economy 
has undergone. In this connection, two different methodologies are used. The first rests on an 
assessment of sectoral output losses as a result of the epidemic containment measures; the 
second is based on simulations of the main transmission channels of the economic effects of the 
pandemic, using the Banco de España Quarterly Model (MTBE). The results of the different 
scenarios point to reductions in Spanish GDP in 2020 unprecedented in recent history. That said, 
the scale of the reductions is highly sensitive to the starting assumptions, over whose plausibility 
there is much uncertainty. Once the height of the crisis is behind us in the short term, activity 
should begin to recover at a rate which will in any event depend on how the health risk is perceived 
in the coming months and on the capacity for recovery of that part of the productive system most 
damaged by the current shutdown. With a view to 2021, foreseeably the Spanish economy will 
substantially - but not fully – recoup the course of activity and employment expected before the 
pandemic. 
It is necessary to highlight, in any case, the provisional nature of these calculations. They must be 
subjected in the coming months to ongoing revision as new information progressively becomes 
available.
Keywords: macroeconomic outlook, scenario, simulation, COVID-19, pandemic, recession, 
shock, sectoral analysis.
JEL classification: E1, E17, E20, E27, E60, C53, C67, I1.
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1  Summary and conclusions
The global spread of the COVID-19 disease, caused by a coronavirus, and, above all, 
the measures taken to reduce the loss of human lives have led most economies to 
shut down significant areas of activity and, therefore, to a large, abrupt fall in GDP. 
The global health crisis has thus given rise to a global economic crisis. Given the size 
of the problem, the economic authorities have reacted by taking measures across 
the board to mitigate the severe health, social and economic effects of the crisis.
This is also been the case in Spain, where, in order to contain the spread of the 
disease, the authorities have ordered confinement of the population to their homes 
and the closure of entire sectors of economic activity. These include, in particular, 
some of the most labour intensive service industries, such as accommodation and 
food service activities and a significant part of retail trade.. The rapid increase in the 
number of cases caused the government to declare a state of alert on 14 March for 
a period of two weeks, which has since been extended by two 15-day periods to 26 
April. The mobility restrictions were tightened between 30 March and 9 April, with 
the suspension of all non-essential economic activity.1
The impact of the decline in productive activity has been especially apparent in the 
labour market. In the days immediately prior to the declaration of the state of alert on 
31 March, social security registrations declined by almost 900,000 (4.6% of the 
total). Furthermore, a very large number of workers have been affected by temporary 
layoffs (ERTEs), so that although they remain registered for social security they are 
not currently working.
The activity shock and job losses have led to a pronounced contraction of domestic 
demand. This has been compounded by the shock from abroad, in so far as similar 
developments in other countries have given rise to severely weakened demand for 
goods and services from the rest of the world and disruption to global value chains, 
along with the cessation of tourist flows.
The authorities have responded to these developments, at national, European and 
global level, by deploying a whole range of measures. In the various geographical 
areas, including Spain, some of the measures with a direct budget impact have been 
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1  Moreover, on 18 April the Prime Minister announced the motion for a third extension of the lockdown for two 
weeks longer, until 9 May. He also outlined the first steps of a confinement exit strategy, which include the 
possibility of the lifting of the measures not taking place simultaneously in all the country’s regions, depending on 
how the epidemic is evolving in each region.
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designed to increase the resources available to the health system in order to mitigate 
the public health consequences of the disease. Also in the area of fiscal policy, the 
shutting down of numerous economic activities has led to the adoption of measures 
designed to alleviate the loss of incomes for the most vulnerable households and to 
ensure that firms have sufficient liquidity, through public guarantee schemes for 
bank loans and tax deferrals, to meet their payment obligations. 
In the monetary policy realm, in the specific case of the euro area, the Eurosystem 
has approved large-scale financial asset purchases, to allow euro area private 
agents and fiscal authorities to benefit from low financing costs, and has adopted 
various measures to boost bank lending. Turning to prudential supervision policy, 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism has decided to allow credit institutions to operate 
temporarily with certain capital and liquidity ratios below the required levels. Also, 
the Banco de España and relevant international agencies in particular the European 
Banking Authority and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have provided 
clarification on how the impact of the health crisis should be reflected in the 
institutions’ financial information, in order to avoid undesired procyclical effects.
In the short term, the main objective of the action taken is to guarantee a flow of 
income for agents whose income sources have been most directly affected by the 
epidemic. Moreover, in the medium term, these measures should, by limiting the risk 
that the transitory shock may give rise to a durable – and even permanent – reduction, 
contribute to boosting the economic recovery, once the health emergency has been 
contained and the extraordinary measures to restrict population movement begin to 
be rolled back.
This notwithstanding, the economic outlook is currently surrounded by a high degree 
of uncertainty. The first important source of uncertainty relates to the duration of the 
period of confinement. Five weeks after the declaration of the state of alert in Spain, the 
latest figures on the spread of the disease, particularly in terms of number of deaths, 
show how the restriction of population movement is proving effective in containing the 
epidemic. That said, the observed course of COVID-19 in other countries where the 
disease spread earlier than in Spain suggests that the state of alert may be extended 
up to the end, on 9 May, of the new extension envisaged following the Government’s 
motion, or for even longer. Based on these prior experiences, the scenarios presented 
in this article envisage a hypothetical duration of eight weeks, in the case considered 
most likely, and, in an alternative case, 12 weeks.
There is also uncertainty as regards the scope of the measures that may be needed, 
when the state of alert has been lifted, to avoid new cases and to contain those that 
do arise. Moreover, the absence of any similar historical precedent with which to 
compare the current global crisis makes analysis of the impact on the economy and 
the financial sector of the measures adopted by the various authorities - the scope 
and extent of which are also unprecedented - especially complicated.
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These sources of uncertainty make it difficult to prepare macroeconomic projections 
using the standard methodologies. This is why the decision was taken to prepare a 
number of alternative scenarios for this article, using different types of analytical 
tool. When the Quarterly report on the Spanish economy was published on 25 March, 
there were still no monthly indicators available to assess the extent of the shock 
which was, in any case, presumed to be very large.2 The information that has become 
available during the two weeks since then, in particular in relation to the behaviour of 
employment, provides at least an initial basis for formulating these scenarios. In any 
event, the results of the scenarios are highly tentative and should be understood as 
merely indicative of the order of magnitude of the potential economic effects of the 
pandemic. 
Two alternative approaches have been used to construct the scenarios, one from the 
standpoint of supply and the other from that of demand, each of which emphasises 
different aspects of shock transmission mechanisms. It should therefore be 
emphasised that the quantitative results obtained under these two approaches are 
not directly comparable, on the same analytical basis. In this respect, these two 
approaches should be understood as complementing each other and not as two 
sides of the same coin.
The supply-side approach starts by calibrating the magnitude of the fall in output in 
the various sectors of the economy as an immediate consequence of the measures 
taken to contain the epidemic over the period in which it is estimated they will remain 
in force. Thus, under a set of assumptions that includes, in particular, that the state 
of alert will last for a total of eight weeks, the decline in GDP in 2020 is estimated to 
range from 6.6% to 8.7%, depending on the degree of persistence of the shock 
beyond the end of the current state of confinement (in particular, in those sectors of 
the economy in which social interaction plays an important role, such as hotels, 
restaurants and leisure, which are also those most exposed to tourism), which could 
partially approximate the risk of fresh outbreaks of the epidemic. In a scenario that 
combines a duration for the state of alert of 12 weeks with a greater persistence of 
the effects when confinement ends, it is estimated that GDP could fall by as much 
as 13.6% in 2020. Specifically, scenario 1 envisages the virtually complete 
normalisation of activity as from Q3. Scenario 3, meantime, assumes that the sectors 
affected will not attain their end-2019 level of output until 2020 Q4 (except in 
accommodation and food service activities and leisure, for which a slower recovery 
is projected). Scenario 2 is at an intermediate point between the two. 
This supply-based methodology, with its markedly accounting nature, is useful to obtain 
a clear estimate of the initial magnitude of the shock. However, it does not provide a 
description of subsequent developments, beyond the short term, since it does not 
include any explicit modelling of the relationships between the economic aggregates.
2  See Banco de España (2020), Quarterly report on the Spanish economy, Economic Bulletin 1/2020.
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The second approach, based on simulations of different scenarios obtained using 
the Quarterly Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de España (MTBE), the model 
normally used to make macroeconomic projections, partly addresses this 
shortcoming. The MTBE amounts to a schematic description of the main relationships 
of the Spanish economy, which sheds light on the most important shock transmission 
channels. Also, this tool allows us to incorporate alternative assessments of the 
expected impact of economic policy measures implemented to counter the effects 
of the epidemic containment measures.
The scenarios constructed using the MTBE incorporate a set of shocks approximating 
the effects of the pandemic. The first of these shocks reflects the fact that the 
restrictions established in other countries on economic activity and population 
movement have caused a drastic decline in the demand for Spanish goods and 
services from the rest of the world, especially in the area of tourism. In Spain, the 
loss of household and corporate incomes leads to a reduction in current spending, 
which is alleviated in the short term by credit moratoria and guarantees. However, 
these give rise to future payment commitments and therefore reduce the ability of 
households and firms to engage in consumption and investment in the medium term. 
Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the future (in particular, due to the perception 
of the risk of fresh outbreaks of the disease) leads agents to postpone spending 
decisions. This combination of shocks gives rise to a fall in GDP in 2020 in the three 
scenarios constructed, of -6.8%, -9.5% and -12.4%, depending on the whether the 
As in the case of other countries, the shock to the Spanish economy is notable in its severity. There is, however, much uncertainty over the 
specific impact it will have on GDP growth in 2020, which depends on factors such as the duration of the confinement, the characteristics of 
the transition back to normality and the success of economic policies in restricting the persistence of the effects on activity and employment. 
In any event, a rebound is expected as from the second half of the year, paving the way to a notable recovery in 2021.
DIFFERENT GDP GROWTH SCENARIOS FOR SPAIN IN 2020 AND 2021, BASED ON DIFFERENT METHODOLOGIES 
AND ASSUMPTIONS
Table 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
2020 2021
Supply-side approach
    Scenario  1 -6.6 — 8 Almost complete normalisation after confinement
    Scenario  2 -8.7 — 8 Almost complete normalisation in Q4 after confinement
    Scenario  3 -13.6 — 12 Incomplete normalisation at end-year (particularly in sectors linked to 
accommodation and food service acvtivities and leisure)
Simulations with the MTBE
    Scenario  1 -6.8 5.5 8 The measures prevent lasting job losses and company closures
    Scenario  2 -9.5 6.1 8 A certain proportion of firms do not manage to prevent liquidity 
problems from becoming solvency ones
    Scenario  3 -12.4 8.5 12 A certain proportion (bigger than in scenario 2) of firms do not manage 
to prevent liquidity problems from becoming solvency ones
Average annual rates Confinement
duration
(in weeks)
Other key assumptions
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duration of confinement is eight weeks (scenarios 1 and 2) or 12 weeks (scenario 3) 
and whether the liquidity problems of private agents lead to solvency difficulties in 
the coming months (scenarios 2 and 3) or do not (scenario 1). 
A comparison of the results of these three scenarios shows that the consequences 
of the shock for activity and employment this year, although very severe, will be 
somewhat reduced by the measures to provide liquidity and income flows in the 
short term. Specifically, in each of the three scenarios the end-2020 level of GDP will 
be lower by 8.5, 10.4 and 12.5 pp than that foreseen in the December 2019 projections 
(see Chart 5.1). However, the economic policy measures not only permit the depth of 
the recession to be reduced in the short term, they should also be conducive to the 
achievement of a higher level of GDP and employment over a longer time horizon. 
The exercises performed consider a horizon extending to the end of 2021, when it is 
estimated that the level of GDP will be approximately 3% lower than in the absence 
of COVID-19 in the first scenario, as against 5% lower in the other two.
In any event, the various scenarios constructed show that the cost to the budget of 
the recession caused by COVID-19 will be very high, both as a consequence of the 
measures adopted and, especially, the action of automatic stabilisers. According to 
the various scenarios considered, in 2020 the budget deficit will be within the range 
of approximately -7% to -11% of GDP, while public debt will stand between 
approximately 110% and 120% of GDP.
The exercises carried out for this article, under the two approaches used, should be 
understood as preliminary. Thus, they will be subject to revision, as and when new 
information reduces the current high level of uncertainty, particularly as regards the 
duration of the state of alert, the possible need for additional containment measures 
in future and the estimated effectiveness of the measures taken to encourage the 
resumption of the employment and commercial relationships that existed prior to the 
emergence of the virus between businesses and their employees and customers 
when the state of alert is lifted.
2  Relevant aspects of the epidemic for the construction of the scenarios
COVID-19 is a disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. It emerged in China 
in late December 2019 and spread rapidly to an increasing number of countries 
during the early months of 2020, before being officially declared a pandemic by the 
World Health Organisation on 11 March. As at 19 April almost 165,000 people 
worldwide have lost their lives to the disease, with just under 2.4 million people 
infected (see Chart 1.1). The rapid spread of the disease has overwhelmed healthcare 
systems in numerous countries and has led to strict restrictions on personal 
interaction, aiming to curb the rate of contagion and the number of fatalities. The 
measures taken have severely limited economic activity, with the consequent 
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collateral damage in the shape of a marked contraction in GDP in the different 
economies in the first half of the year.
In any event, the confinement measures are proving effective in limiting the spread of 
the disease. In China, which was the first country affected by COVID-19 and, therefore, 
The number of new cases continues to grow rapidly in Europe and in the United States, while it remains relatively contained in Asia. In Spain, 
one of the countries most affected, the epidemic is beginning to be under control, with decreases in the numbers of deaths.
COVID-19 EPIDEMIC (a)
Chart 1
SOURCES: Banco de España and Johns Hopkins CSSE.
a The charts have been prepared with data to April 15.
b The lines of some countries are lagged by the number of days indicated in the legend, depending on when the epidemic commenced.
c The figures in brackets after the name of each country are the maximum daily number of deaths recorded. These figures have been 
rescaled to make them coincide on the Y-axis for all the countries (although at different points in time). The X-axis shows the number 
of days elapsed since the first confinement was ordered in each country.
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the first to impose restrictions on mobility and activity, there appears to have been a 
dramatic reduction in new infections (see Chart 1.2). In Italy, where the number of 
infections rose sharply in the last ten days of February and the first half of March, the 
daily number of new cases has tended to decline since then, although it remains high. 
By contrast, in other countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, at 
the cut-off date for this article the rate of growth of new cases is still very high.
Spain is one of the countries that has been hardest hit by COVID-19. As at 19 April, 
the total number of infections was almost 196,000, and the number of deaths was 
close to 20,500. As in other countries, the increase in infections in the first half of 
March led the authorities to adopt various measures to contain the epidemic and, on 
14 March, to declare the state of alert. The measures in place entail the stoppage of 
all face-to-face educational activity, restrictions on movement within the country, the 
suspension of much retail and industrial activity and, ultimately, confinement of the 
population. 
In consequence, as in other countries, the rate of new infections has dropped 
significantly since early April (see Chart 1.3) while, as was the case in China and in 
Italy, the number of daily deaths began to decline just over 20 days after the 
confinement measures were imposed (see Chart 1.4).
Clearly, then the confinement measures adopted in Spain and in many other countries 
are proving effective in containing the COVID-19 health emergency. Yet questions 
remain regarding how long such severe measures will have to remain in place. In 
addition, more recently, in view of the severe impact these measures are having on 
activity and employment, the debate has revolved around the conditions required to 
ensure that the lifting of the confinement measures and a gradual return to normal 
economic activity are compatible with minimising the risks of the emergence of new 
outbreaks of the epidemic.
Regarding the duration of the confinement period, confirmation that the course of 
the epidemic in Spain is roughly following the pattern observed earlier in China (just 
under 50  days behind) takes away some of the uncertainty. In Wuhan, the initial 
epicentre of COVID-19, eight weeks elapsed between the confinement order and the 
absence of new infections, and 11 weeks passed before the restrictions were fully 
lifted. The experience in Wuhan, and subsequently in Italy, where the disease also 
appeared earlier than in Spain, forms the basis for the two alternative assumptions 
used in this article, according to which the confinement period could last either eight 
or 12 weeks.
That said, although confinement is proving to be an effective method of controlling 
the disease, there are more uncertainties regarding the scenario that will emerge 
when the confinement measures are lifted. On the one hand, it is highly unlikely that 
the pandemic may be eradicated completely in the short term. This opens up the 
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possibility of new outbreaks of the epidemic arising from undetected cases. On the 
other hand, even if there are no new cases of infection in Spain, opening up our 
external borders could let in persons who are carrying the infection but are still in the 
incubation period. These possible scenarios, the probability of which is still extremely 
difficult to estimate, could lead to confinement measures being reintroduced.
In consequence, it seems unlikely, from the standpoint of economic activity, that the 
current standstill of a significant portion of that activity will be followed by a rapid 
and complete return to normal. This is something that may foreseeably only be 
possible when a vaccine or an effective new anti-virus treatment becomes available. 
In the meantime, a number of strategies have begun to be outlined, aiming to make 
public health concerns compatible with containing the costs in terms of economic 
activity and employment. These strategies cover a very broad range of non-mutually 
exclusive aspects, such as gradually permitting economic activities where infection 
can be prevented by means of safety protocols (including, for example, maximising 
hygiene measures or guaranteeing minimal interpersonal distancing), using 
identification technologies to detect persons who have been in contact with infected 
persons, segmenting confinement measures according to the degree of vulnerability 
to the disease of the different population groups, or mass testing to detect the 
presence both of the disease and of antibodies.
The simulations presented here do not explicitly capture the effects on activity of a 
partial return to normality when the state of alert ends, nor the emergence of new 
outbreaks of the epidemic. However, as described below, they do include a channel 
whereby private agents’ spending decisions do not completely return to normal after 
confinement, which is equatable to their perception of the risk of the disease 
continuing beyond the initial lifting of the confinement measures.
3  Short-term information
In the period since confinement began, relatively detailed information has become 
available on the initial adverse impact on the labour market. These effects are 
manifest in the daily series of Social Security registrations and registered 
unemployment to end-March, revealing a reduction in numbers registered of almost 
900,000 people (4.6% of the total) in the second half of the month (see Chart 2.1). By 
sector, the decline was particularly pronounced - when comparing the figures for the 
final days of February and March - in activities relating to accommodation and food 
services and to leisure, those most affected by the announcement of the state of 
alert, and also in construction (see Chart 2.2). In terms of type of contract, job 
destruction was concentrated among temporary workers, while the decline in 
registrations among those with a permanent contract was small, a development that 
powerfully highlights the marked disparity in the degree of protection afforded to 
both groups of employees. 
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In any event, these indicators only provide a partial view of the effects on the labour 
market of the restrictions imposed on activity. Specifically, an even greater portion 
of the adjustment to employment has come about through short-time work 
arrangements (ERTEs by their Spanish acronym), a mechanism that does not entail 
the breaking of the employee/employer relationship or deregistration for Social 
Security purposes. It does however involve an interruption of labour activity. In the 
employment figures, these persons continued to feature as employed; nonetheless, 
this is not actually the case in an economic sense. 
Both this labour market information and that from other indicators points to a collapse 
in economic activity in the second fortnight of March and at the start of Q2. The 
collapse is expected to have abruptly halted a period of uninterrupted growth for the 
Spanish economy that has run for over six years. One indicator that draws together 
these developments is the composite PMI. In March it posted the most pronounced 
decline in its time series, falling by more than 25 points to a level of 26.7, the lowest 
level reached to date (see Chart 3.1). The course of this indicator in the other euro 
area economies was similar. Chiefly behind this unprecedented decline was the 
services component, while the reduction in the manufacturing index was more 
moderate (see Chart 3.2). In the services indicator, the activity-restricting measures 
introduced to curb the expansion of the epidemic gave rise to particularly marked 
In the second half of March, following the declaration of the state of alert, there were very large falls in Social Security regisrations, especially in 
accommodation and food service activities, leisure and construction.
IMPACT OF CONFINEMENT ON EMPLOYMENT
Chart 2
SOURCES: Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones.
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contractions in the indices of activity and new orders, especially as regards the 
accommodation and food service activities sector. 
The availability of quantitative indicators that measure the impact of the restrictions 
introduced under the state of alert on the various demand components is, so far, 
very limited. Among the few indicators at hand are those relating to new private car 
registrations and commercial vehicles in March, which respectively proxy durable 
goods consumption and investment in transport equipment. In both cases, the year-
on-year declines stood at around 60% (see Chart 3.3), and they were moreover 
The activities most directly affected by the confinement are certain services sectors. On the demand side, the impact on tourism is most 
pronounced, but so too is it on the other demand components.
THE EFFECTS ON ACTIVITY ARE PROVING SEVERE
Chart 3
SOURCES: INE, European Commission, Markit Economics, ANFAC, DGT, European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation and 
Banco de España.
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concentrated in the second half of the month, as was to be expected. The restrictions 
set in place have acutely affected tourist flows, as reflected in the daily series of air 
traffic in Spanish airports (see Chart 3.4). 
All this information provides an initial starting point for analysing short-term 
developments in the Spanish economy and for formulating scenarios for its medium-
term outlook. However, as the following section sets out, this evidence is incomplete 
and not to be taken as reliable in order to estimate quarter-on-quarter GDP growth 
in Q1 and, especially, in Q2. 
4 The supply-side standpoint
The standard procedure followed by the Banco de España to estimate the path of activity 
in the short term (the current and the next quarter) is based on the use of statistical 
models that interpret, on the basis of empirical regularities observed in the past, the 
behaviour of monthly indicators, translating it into estimates of quarter-on-quarter GDP 
growth rates. These estimates are updated as new information becomes available.3
On this occasion, however, this conventional methodology may not adequately 
capture the exceptional events that have taken place since the middle of March. 
Consequently, an alternative approach has been used to estimate the behaviour of 
output in each week of the period of confinement. This consists in estimating the 
level of activity in the various productive sectors of the economy in the light of the 
restrictions introduced in each of them by Royal Decree 463/2020 (and by Royal 
Decree-Law 10/2020 during the two weeks of prohibition of non-essential activities).4
Specifically, productive activity has been broken down into a total of ten sectors, whose 
respective weights in GDP are set out in Chart 4.1. The decline in value added as a 
consequence of the state of alert has been estimated for each of these sectors, both 
directly and indirectly as a result of the declines in the other sectors, in accordance with 
input-output tables. Aggregating the activity levels obtained for each sector, using their 
relative weights in GDP, gives an estimate of the level of GDP during the confinement, on 
the basis of which quarter-on-quarter rates of change are obtained for this aggregate.5
3  For the current quarter, the various short-term models provide updates with each new indicator up until publication 
by the INE of its preliminary National Accounts estimate (which, in the case of 2020 Q1, is due on 30 April).
4  More precisely, the estimation of the level of sectoral activity in each of the weeks in which the state of alert is in 
force is based on three elements. The most important one is direct interpretation of the content of these two 
decrees. Secondly, the granular information of the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Date Office (CBBE) is 
used to help approximate the proportion of activity affected in each sector. Finally, the calculations have been 
supplemented by interpretation of the results of a survey conducted by the Banco de España on a sample of 
Central Balance Sheet Data Office companies (see Box 1).
5  To simplify the analysis, the fact that, in any particular industry, output in each week of the year may, in normal 
circumstances, vary considerably is not taken into account. For example, the level of output of automobiles is 
usually much higher in the last week of January than in the first week of August, while in the case of accommodation 
and food service activities precisely the reverse is the case.
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In particular, the entry into force of the state of alert has entailed very significant 
declines in activity in three of the services subsectors. In the case of accommodation 
and food service activities and leisure the reduction in output in each of the weeks 
of confinement is assumed to be 100%, in view of the compulsory closure of 
establishments of this nature.6 In the case of retail and wholesale trade a decline in 
activity of somewhat less than 50% is assumed, since that is the proportion which, 
according to Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office (CBBE) data, is 
not linked to the distribution of essential products (inter alia, food and health 
products) which, under Royal Decree 463/2020, are permitted to operate as normal. 
Finally, in the transport sector it is estimated that the state of alert is consistent with 
a 60% lower level of activity than normal, on the assumption that almost all passenger 
transport and about half of goods transport (that part relating to the distribution of 
non-essential products) has been lost. In other market services sectors, the 
hypothesis made is that there is no direct closure of activity.7
As regards industry, the loss of activity is assumed to be complete in the case of 
manufacture of motor vehicles, while in other manufacturing industries it is assumed 
The services sectors most directly affected by the shutdown (accommodation and food service activities, leisure, retail trade and transport) 
account for one-quarter of GDP. The impact on GDP growth in 2020 is all the greater the more necessary it is to lengthen confinement and 
the longer it takes to restore normality after confinement.
THE EFFECT OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS ON GDP GROWTH IN 2020: A SUPPLY-SIDE APPROACH
Chart 4
SOURCES: INE and own calculations.
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6  This assumption may be somewhat extreme, in so far as Royal Decree 463/2020 permits home deliveries.
7  There is, however, a modest decline in output as a consequence of spillover effects.
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to be somewhat less than 30% as a consequence of the spillover effects from other 
industries.8 Construction is assumed to be operating as normal (except during the 
two weeks of complete cessation of non-essential economic activities). Finally, given 
their essential activity status, it is assumed that there is no loss of activity in the 
primary and energy sectors (along with a certain increase in activity in non-market 
services).
These assumptions entail a decline in output of approximately 30% during each of 
the weeks in which the state of alert has been in force, which would automatically 
deduct 0.6 pp from the average annual GDP growth rate.9, 10 Having defined the 
magnitude of the decrease in weekly activity during the period of confinement in 
each industry, three scenarios have been considered that differ in two respects: the 
hypotheses made regarding the duration of the state of alert and the speed of 
recovery following its termination. In the first two scenarios, the duration of the state 
of alert is assumed to be eight weeks, while in the third it is assumed to be 12. As 
regards the speed of recovery, scenario 1 envisages an almost complete normalisation 
of activity as from Q3, while scenario 3 assumes that all sectors will have the same 
level of output in Q4 as in the same period of 2019 (except accommodation and food 
service activities and leisure), with scenario 2 lying between scenarios 1 and 3. 
According to the results of these exercises, in the first quarter of 2020 Q1, only the 
last 15 days of which were subject to the state of alert, GDP is estimated to have 
decreased by 4.7%. This figure, which does not depend on the scenario considered, 
should be interpreted with considerable caution, since it depends crucially on the 
assumptions made regarding the proportionate decline in activity in each industry, 
which are subject to a high degree of uncertainty. 
The increase in the number of weeks of confinement in Q2 leads to an increase in the 
quarter-on-quarter rate of decline in GDP in this period, which is greater in the second 
scenario than in the first and in the third scenario than in the second, in line with the 
assumptions made. Naturally, the level of precision of these estimates, diminishes as 
the horizon they refer to is extended, in accordance with the uncertainty as to the 
duration of the state of alert, the speed and form of the recovery and the rather 
mechanical nature of this methodology, which ignores the relationships between the 
main macroeconomic aggregates. Subject to these caveats, under the assumptions 
 8  This fall will be almost three times as large, having taken into account the spillover effects, during the two weeks 
in which non-essential economic activity was suspended.
 9  As the decline in output is estimated to have been 60% during the weeks in which non-essential economic 
activity was prohibited, the decrease in the average annual GDP growth rate would in that case be 1.2 pp.
10  Two additional dimensions of interest are the regional one and comparison with other European countries. In the 
first case, taking into account the heterogeneity of the productive structures across regions, the impact of the 
crisis will be greater in those in which tourism activity is most important and in those in which motor vehicle 
manufacturer has a higher weight (both directly, due to plant closures, and through spillover effects on other 
sectors). As regards the comparison with Europe, the Spanish economy is moderately more vulnerable than the 
three largest euro area economies owing to its greater dependence on sectors directly affected by the 
confinement.
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of each of the three scenarios considered, the fall in average GDP for the current year 
is estimated to be –6.6%, –8.7% and –13.6%, respectively (see Chart 4.2).
5 Reference macroeconomic scenarios constructed using the MTBE
The second procedure used to assess the potential impact of the pandemic on the 
economy is the formulation of scenarios using the MTBE, the model normally used 
by the Banco de España to prepare its macroeconomic projections.11 In the current 
extraordinary circumstances, these alternative exercises are less appropriate than 
those presented in the previous section as a description of short-term developments 
(which can be identified with the first half of the year), but they are more robust at 
longer time horizons. In any event, the scenarios presented below should be 
understood as stylised descriptions of the developments to be expected in 
accordance with a number of starting assumptions, on the basis of which it is only 
possible to formulate hypotheses with a limited degree of precision. For this reason, 
the effects obtained as a result of these simulations are subject to an unusually high 
degree of uncertainty and, therefore, are preliminary in nature.
5.1 The description of the scenarios
As in the exercises in the previous section, a total of three scenarios have been 
considered, which also differ from one another, partly according to the period during 
which the population confinement measures and economic activity restrictions are 
maintained, and partly according to the persistence, beyond the period of compulsory 
interruption of activity, of the consequences of the health shock. In the first of these 
(scenario 1) it is assumed that the duration of the period of confinement will be eight 
weeks and that it will be followed by a rise in economic activity, in a setting in which 
the health crisis is overcome relatively rapidly. On one hand, the eight week duration 
approximately replicates the developments observed in China. As indicated in the 
second section of this article, this assumption is based on the fact that the epidemic 
in Spain, over the five weeks that have elapsed since the declaration of the state of 
alert, has followed a comparable trajectory to that observed previously in China over 
a similar period. On the other hand, a relatively rapid rise in activity seems to be 
consistent with China’s experience following the end of confinement, in so far as the 
indicators available suggest that in recent weeks an incipient dynamic recovery has 
been under way in this Asian economy.12 An important hypothesis underlying this 
11  See A. Arencibia, S. Hurtado, M. de Luis and E. Ortega,  (2017), New version of the Quarterly Model of Banco 
de España (MTBE), Banco de España, Documentos Ocasionales 17/09. The MTBE is a medium scale 
macroeconomic model composed of error correction equations in which the dynamics of the economy are 
essentially determined by the demand side. It is normally used not only to prepare projections for the Spanish 
economy, but also to develop simulations of various scenarios, as in this article.
12  See Box 2 regarding the assumptions about the duration of the confinement in the different regions and the 
intensity of the subsequent rebound.
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early recovery in economic activity following the period of confinement is that public 
measures to provide funds to households and businesses are effective in terms of 
limiting lasting job losses and business closures. 
In scenario 2, while the assumption that the duration of the period of confinement 
will be eight weeks is maintained, the degree of effectiveness of the measures taken 
by the authorities to reduce the persistence of the effects of the pandemic is assumed 
to be more limited than in the previous case. In order to calibrate the magnitude of 
these effects, individual company data from the Banco de España Central Balance 
Sheet Date Office are used to assess, given a number of assumptions, the proportion 
of non-financial corporations that, having experienced liquidity problems as a 
consequence of the crisis, may suffer solvency difficulties.13
Lastly, in scenario 3, the possibility of the current state of alert being maintained for up 
to 12 weeks is assumed. In addition, similarly to scenario 2, it is assumed that the 
economic and financial difficulties in the productive sector will last for longer. This is 
consistent with the view that the negative effects of COVID-19 on activity will tend to be 
more persistent if it is necessary to extend the containment measures for longer or to 
reintroduce certain measures at some point to suppress any new outbreak of the 
epidemic. In consequence, in this last scenario the rate of economic growth is slower.
These scenarios, whose main variables are presented, in this case, for the period 
2020-21, are built on a combination of several shocks that aim to proxy the effects 
of the pandemic, and on certain assumptions relating to a set of variables that are 
described below.
5.1.1 COVID-19 shocks
A first channel of transmission of the effects of the pandemic on the Spanish 
economy is the impact of the disease on the global economy. Box 2 presents the 
details of several quantitative exercises that calibrate the shocks felt in the different 
geographical areas and simulate the corresponding impacts. Specifically, the box 
sets out three scenarios for the world economy, constructed using similar 
assumptions to those used to prepare the scenarios for Spain. These would give rise 
to sharp declines in GDP among Spain’s trading partners in 2020, varying in severity 
13  As the starting point for the calibration, hypotheses are made regarding the behaviour of the costs and income 
of companies during the crisis period, taking into account the varying degree of limitations on activity in each 
sector and the possibility of making use of ERTEs. On this basis it is possible to determine the weight in the 
value-added of each sector of the firms that would experience liquidity shortages that cannot be covered by 
resorting to liquid assets, pre-existing credit lines or the new credit line obtained through the public guarantee 
programme, so that it is assumed that temporarily they will not be able to make any new investment. It is further 
assumed that where the shortfall exceeds 20% of a company’s capital, it will be obliged to suspend its activity, 
leading to the loss of its employment.
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according to the scenario used. In all three scenarios, the drop in external demand 
for Spanish exports would be greater than that seen during the crisis that broke out 
in 2008. The severity of these declines gives rise to a very significant contraction in 
Spanish exports. The impact is particularly pronounced in the case of tourism 
services, where receipts disappear completely during confinement and are 
subsequently gradually restored, returning in the summer of 2021 to the level they 
would have reached before the shock.
In the case of domestic demand, the confinement measures have reduced or brought 
to a complete standstill the activity of numerous productive sectors. This has resulted 
in a significant loss of income for households and firms. The public programmes 
introduced to alleviate these income losses partially mitigate the negative effects on 
spending. But although the deferrals and loans offered to firms and the moratoria on 
loan repayments and rentals for vulnerable households serve to mitigate their 
liquidity constraints, the fact that the corresponding payments will have to be made 
once the confinement measures are lifted has an adverse impact on expected 
income and, therefore, on current and future spending.
The effects of the shutdown of the service industries affected by the state of alert 
have been introduced into the simulations via reductions in the various items of 
private consumption that are directly affected. Also, together with the direct effects 
on spending resulting from the healthcare crisis and the measures adopted to 
contain infection, the simulations include a channel of heightened uncertainty, 
associated in particular with the possibility of new outbreaks of COVID-19 that may 
make it necessary to adopt new containment measures.14 The heightened uncertainty 
for households is reflected in an increase in precautionary saving as a proportion of 
their income. For firms, uncertainty hinders cost-benefit analysis of investment 
projects, which leads to this spending component being curtailed and employment 
decisions being put on hold. In the simulations, this effect has been calibrated based 
on the recent increase observed in an economic uncertainty indicator designed by 
the Banco de España and its historical relationship with GDP, consumption and 
investment.15 Lastly, the simulations include the fall observed in stock prices, to 
approximate the deterioration in the equity markets.16
5.1.2 Scenario assumptions
The technical assumptions refer to the expected path of exchange rates, interest 
rates and oil prices. The paths of these variables have been drawn using the 
14  In the global scenarios, the channel of heightened uncertainty has been introduced via an increase in the 
investment risk premium, which is not included in the MTBE.
15  See C. Ghirelli, M. Gil, J. Pérez and A. Urtasun (2019), Measuring economic and economic policy uncertainty and 
their macroeconomic effects: the case of Spain, Banco de España Working Paper 1905.
16  A channel that is missing from the simulations, given the difficulties involved in its calibration, is the possibility that 
the healthcare crisis and the containment measures may have given rise to a temporary decrease in the labour 
supply, through sickness leave or the need to assume childcare responsibilities as a result of the shutdown of 
schools (effects which, in some cases, will have been partially offset by the increase in teleworking).
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methods commonly employed in the projection exercises. Essentially, these 
consist of considering the most recent developments in the spot (exchange rates) 
and futures (interest rates and oil prices) markets. Since the outbreak of the 
pandemic, the exchange rate has been markedly stable, despite the scale of the 
shocks to the global economy. In turn, the absence of the significant tightening 
that has been a recent feature of the interest rate curve in the euro area largely 
reflects the impact of the decisive monetary policy measures adopted in March. 
Lastly, oil prices have fallen sharply as a result of the drop in global demand. This 
fall has been exacerbated by the difficulties observed for agreement to be reached 
between the producer countries on adapting their supply to the new market 
conditions.
The scenarios also include the raft of discretionary fiscal policy measures approved 
by the Government since 12 March to cushion the effects of the crisis.17 These 
measures focus on three areas: strengthening the healthcare system, protecting 
employment and supporting vulnerable households, and providing liquidity to firms. 
Of these, the only area with a well-defined budgetary cost is the increase in 
government consumption related to the increase in healthcare expenditure, which 
encompasses budget items amounting to €4.4 billion (0.4% of 2019 GDP).18, 19
The other measures envisaged will have a potentially significant – but as yet 
unquantifiable – impact on the budget deficit in 2020. The support measures for 
employment and for income in the case of vulnerable households include greater 
flexibility in layoffs and short-time work arrangements and a waiver of the 
corresponding Social Security contributions, a special unemployment subsidy for 
temporary workers and domestic help and, lastly, easier access to benefits for 
cessation of activity by the self-employed.20 Most of these measures will remain in 
place until the state of alarm ends, which means that the cost will be 50% higher in 
scenario 3 (a 12-week confinement period) than in scenarios 1 and 2 (eight weeks).21 
In addition, the cost will depend on the number of persons within each of the groups 
affected who take up the measures. Specifically, the simulations assume that the 
layoffs and short-time work arrangements will affect 3.1 million workers, the benefits 
for cessation of activity by the self-employed 0.9  million and the unemployment 
benefits for temporary workers 0.6 million, with a total cost of €6 billion (70% owing 
17  The measures approved are set out in three Royal Decree Laws: RDL 7/2020, RDL 8/2020 and RDL 11/2020.
18  The calculation is based on nominal 2019 GDP. The figure would be higher if the sharp decline expected in real 
GDP in 2020 as a result of the three scenarios considered were included (the greater the decline considered, the 
higher the figure).
19  This figure includes €2.8  billion for the regional governments, €1  billion managed by the Ministry of Health, 
€30  million for research into a vaccine against the coronavirus, and €600 million for the regional and local 
governments to ensure the provision of healthcare services to the most vulnerable population groups.
20  Not included here are those  measures announced, but not yet approved or precisely defined, as is the case of 
the planned minimum living income.
21  These calculations might be conservative in nature, in that some of the measures might, perhaps under a 
different form, remain in place longer than the state of alert.
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to higher unemployment subsidies and 30% to lower Social Security contributions), 
assuming that the state of alert lasts for eight weeks.22
The third key group of measures approved aim to supply liquidity to potentially viable 
firms. These measures include providing public guarantees for loans to private firms, 
for up to €102.4 billion, equivalent to 8.2% of 2019 GDP.23 A moratorium on tax debts 
has also been approved for a six-month period for SMEs and the self-employed, for 
up to €22.8 billion, in addition to the deferral of all firms’ tax payments until 20 May, 
for €3.5 billion.24
Lastly, in the construction of the scenarios, it has been considered, based on the 
experience of the last downturn, that revenue elasticities to the behaviour of their 
respective tax bases may be expected to increase significantly in light of a contraction 
in activity as sharp as that which is expected in 2020. Specifically, in the period 
2008-09, the decline in VAT and corporate income tax revenue exceeded that which 
was to be expected on the basis of historical elasticities by more than 50%.25
5.2 The results of the simulations
The combination of the set of factors described would give rise to a significant 
decline in the Spanish economy’s GDP in 2020. This ranges from -6.8% in scenario 
1 (limited duration of the confinement period and absence of any assistance feedback 
loop between real and financial shocks) to -12.4% in scenario 3 (prolongation of the 
suspension of economic activity and financial difficulties for a portion of firms), with 
a figure of -9.5% in scenario 2 (which combines the short duration of confinement in 
scenario 1 with the relatively persistent financial shock of scenario 3) (see Table 2). 
Whichever the scenario, the decline in GDP would be concentrated in the first half of 
the year and would be followed by recovery in the second. The pick-up will partly 
22  For the purposes of the impact of these measures on the budget deficit and on households’ disposable income, 
it is important to consider that a very significant portion of these amounts would be linked to the normal 
functioning of the automatic stabilisers (specifically, the unemployment benefits for workers affected by layoffs 
and short-time work arrangements would also have been received had the job losses been permanent rather 
than temporary ones).
23  This figure is obtained by adding together the figures corresponding to the public loans and guarantee lines for 
loans to non-financial corporations (€100 billion), for export firms and SMEs (€2 billion) and Official Credit Institute 
(“ICO” by its Spanish acronym) loans for the tourism industry (€400 million). The final cost of this measure for the 
public purse is subject to considerable uncertainty. Specifically, it will depend on the scale of the decline in activity 
and its impact on firms’ capacity to repay their loans (which will most likely vary considerably across sectors). 
Given the difficulties in calibrating this cost, it is not included explicitly in the simulations.
24  These measures will not affect the deficit for the whole of 2020 as they will conclude within the year.
25  For 2021, the forecasts are based on the usual technical assumptions. Specifically, it is assumed that the budget 
items subject to greater discretionality – including most notably, on account of their size, purchases and 
government investment –will behave in line with nominal potential growth. It is also assumed that the trajectory 
of the remaining items of the general government accounts will be governed, in the absence of additional 
measures, by their usual determinants. This implies, in particular, a return to growth in tax revenue in line with the 
respective tax bases.
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reflect the effective taking of consumption and investment decisions that households 
and firms are postponing during the confinement period. However, in none of the 
three cases will the rise in activity be sufficiently sharp as to prevent, at end-2020, 
there being a considerable gap with the level of GDP foreseen in the Banco de 
España projections last December (see Chart 5.1). Specifically, that level would be 
approximately 8.5 pp, 10.5 pp and 12.5 pp lower, respectively, in scenarios 1, 2 and 
3. Even on the end-2021 horizon, GDP would, in scenario 1, still be around 3 pp 
below the level implied in the December 2019 projections, and almost 5 pp down in 
scenarios 2 and 3. 
Regarding the respective contributions of the different shocks to the losses in GDP 
in 2020 in relation to a counterfactual scenario in which the epidemic has not arisen, 
the direct effects of confinement in Spain would exert the biggest contribution, 
taking as an example scenario 2, through the channel of both national and tourist 
services demand. 
Turning to the behaviour of the different demand components, private consumption 
would, in all scenarios, fall markedly this year. That would be as a result of the 
adverse impact of the decline in employment on labour income (which will in part be 
slowdown arising from the downturn in private agents' financial position to which the crisis may give rise. With all the caveats that the 
scenarios require, GDP is estimated to fall, under confinement lasting 8 weeks, by –6.8% if there were no additional financial tightening and 
by –9.5% if there were. If the state of alert were to last 4 weeks longer, in the presence of business solvency problems the fall in GDP could 
steepen to –12.4%.
MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (MTBE) AFTER COVID-19 CRISIS
Table 2
SOURCE: Own calculations.
a Under the EPA (Labour Force Survey) definition, dependent employees affected by ERTEs (layoff) and the self-employed under stand-down 
arrangements continue to be considered, for the purposes of the unemployment definition, as employed (though strictly, from the standpoint of 
their contribution to output, they are not while they remain in this situation).
Year-on-year
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Sce. 1 Sce. 2 Sce. 3
Proj.
Dec-19
Sce. 1 Sce. 2 Sce. 3
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2.6 -13.2 -16.4  -19.0 3.1 19.0 18.7 22.2
    Imports of goods
    and services
2.1 -14.5 -18.4  -22.4 3.2 12.7 12.1 15.5
Unemployment rate (% annual average) (a) 13.7 18.3 20.6 21.7 13.2 17.5 19.1 19.9
Gen. Gvt. net lending/borrowing (% of GDP) -2.2 -7.2 -8.9 -11.0 -1.9 -5.2 -6.5 -7.4
Gen. Gvt. debt (% of annual GDP) 96.0 109.9 115.3 122.3 95.2 109.4 114.5 120.3
12020202
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alleviated in terms of household disposable income by public transfers) and the 
increase in precautionary saving. The reduction in consumption will be particularly 
pronounced as regards durable goods and, in the confinement period, 
accommodation and food service activities. 
Gross fixed capital formation will decline very sharply, particularly in respect of the 
capital goods component. This will be in step with the heavy fall in final demand, the 
worsening financial position of firms and the heightening of uncertainty over how 
long it will be necessary to retain the containment measures and the form any roll-
back of confinement takes. 
Lastly, with regard to the national demand components, a quickening in government 
consumption is expected in 2020. Chiefly behind this will be the announced increases 
in health spending (around 0.4% of GDP) to meet the treatment needs of the 
population affected by the epidemic. 
The marked reduction in external demand will translate into a severe fall-off in goods 
and services exports. The effect will be particularly pronounced in terms of the 
tourism and transport services components. These will be directly affected during 
the confinement period by the restrictions on movement, which include a highly 
significant reduction in international flight figures and a virtually complete closure of 
land borders. The assumptions made incorporate a progressive pick-up in tourist 
flows from the summer this year; however, in the scenario that includes more 
The duration of the confinement and the possibility that private agents' liquidity difficulties may become solvency problems will not only 
determine the depth of the recession but also the level of output in the medium term, owing to the effects on the productive system.
REFERENCE SCENARIOS: BANCO DE ESPAÑA QUARTERLY MODEL (MTBE)
Chart 5
SOURCES: Own calculations and Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones.
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prolonged effects over time, this would not play fully through until mid-2021. One 
factor acting against a swift recovery in tourist inflows is the fact that the epidemic 
containment measures have not been adopted simultaneously in all countries and, 
in particular, that many of these measures have been applied at a later date than in 
Spain. 
The contraction in imports in 2020 will also be most pronounced. This is due not only 
to the severe decline in final demand, but also to the fact that the decline is 
concentrated in the spending components with a higher import content, as is the 
case of investment in equipment and exports. Further, as on the export front, the 
confinement period entails no Spanish tourist flows to the rest of the world. 
The sharp fall in economic activity will have severe consequences for the labour 
market. The decline in employment will be tempered, at least in the short term, by 
the extensive resort to short-time working arrangements (ERTEs by their Spanish 
acronym). In the opposite direction, as in previous recessionary phases in the 
Spanish economy, the pronounced duality in the Spanish labour market between 
those on permanent and those on temporary contracts is translating into a rapid 
concentration of job losses among temporary employees. Indeed, exacerbating this 
latter aspect is the substantial influence of the current crisis on tourist activities 
(which are labour-intensive and with a strong temporary-hire component) and the 
fact it is coinciding in time with the start of the season. 
Depending on the scenario considered, the unemployment rate could rise in 2020, 
in annual average terms, to 18.2%, 20.6% and 21.7 % of the labour force. In step 
with the definitions used in the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA), the unemployment 
rates consider as employed those wage-earners that have availed themselves of 
ERTEs and also the self-employed that have stood down under the related 
arrangements for this group (yet while both sets of workers remain in this situation, 
they might strictly and from a purely economic standpoint be considered not to be 
employed).26 The rise in economic activity would translate into a partial reversal of 
the fall in unemployment in 2021 which, however, would still remain at notably higher 
levels than those projected before the outbreak of the health crisis. 
In whichever scenario, the crisis will have a considerably adverse impact on public 
finances, as a result both of the operation of the automatic stabilisers and of the 
discretionary measures adopted (as detailed in Section 5.1.2). Specifically, the budget 
deficit is expected to stand in 2020 at -7.2, -8.9 and -11% of GDP in each of the three 
scenarios. Public debt is estimated to stand at around 110%, 115% and 122% of 
GDP, respectively, compared with 95.5% at end-2019. These increases in the debt 
ratio reflect both the widening of the deficits and the decline in nominal GDP, whose 
26  For the purposes of the simulations, a figure for dependent employees on ERTEs and self-employed persons on 
stand-down totalling 4,000,000 (for eight weeks in scenarios 1 and 2, and for 12 weeks in scenario 3).
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contribution to these increases in public debt as a percentage of GDP would, in each 
of the three scenarios, be approximately 7, 10.5 and 15.5 pp, respectively. In any 
event, it should be stressed that the level of uncertainty surrounding these projections 
of the fiscal variables is much greater than usual. Indeed, given the uncertain duration 
of the confinement, and the depth and degree of persistence of the decline in income 
many households and firms will undergo, the changing nature of the situation means 
that budgetary policy must remain sufficiently flexible; only thus may temporary 
additional measures be adopted to alleviate the intensity and duration of the recession 
and, therefore, the social and economic costs of the pandemic. 
The epidemic is a global shock which, nonetheless, affects different economies in 
different ways, depending on their structural characteristics and their vulnerabilities. 
Specifically, the high weight of tourism in GDP and employment in Spain,27 in a 
setting in which these sectors are suffering disproportionately from the consequences 
of the pandemic, contributes to the outlook for the Spanish economy having been 
particularly affected. In addition to the high weight in GDP and employment, the 
tourism balance plays a key role in upholding the Spanish economy’s external 
surplus, which is necessary to correct the still-high negative net international 
investment position.28
An additional factor making the Spanish economy more vulnerable to the 
consequences of COVID-19, compared with the main euro area countries, stems 
from certain idiosyncratic characteristics of households and firms in Spain. In the 
case of households, the capacity of the various measures announced to cushion the 
income shock through public transfers is hampered by the high incidence of 
temporary employment. This is because many workers on a temporary contract can 
scarcely avail themselves of the measures approved. Moreover, many workers who 
would normally join the job market from an unemployed status at this time of year 
are seeing their employment options - and therefore their income - significantly 
diminish.29 As regards firms, the comparatively greater weight of SMEs, which will 
foreseeably experience greater difficulties in access to financing than larger 
corporations, raises the risk of companies disappearing as a consequence of the 
crisis. And there is thus also a higher risk that the economy’s level of potential output 
may be harmed as a result. 
27  Specifically, the contribution of tourism to GDP and to employment in Spain would, respectively, be 11.8% and 
13.5% in 2018, the highest among the OECD countries in the case of GDP, and the second-highest, behind 
Iceland, in that of employment. See OECD (2020), OECD Tourism Trends and Policies 2020, OECD Publishing, 
Paris.
28  In 2019, the Spanish economy’s tourism surplus was 2% of GDP. Set against the downturn in the balance on 
tourist services as a result of the pandemic, the energy balance is expected to improve substantially as a 
consequence of the improved terms of trade resulting from the fall in oil prices.
29  The daily registrations figures for the second half of March 2020 show that more than half of the deterioration in 
registrations, compared with the same period a year earlier, is due to the abrupt decline (55%) of new registrations. 
Further, the survey of a sample of firms, whose results are set out in Box 1, indicates how half these companies 
have decided to freeze their plans for new hires (a proportion that exceeds that of those firms that have decided 
to make staff cuts).
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As scenarios 2 and, above all, 3 show, one key aspect for preventing the recovery 
from slowing excessively is the degree of effectiveness of the mechanisms set in 
train to ensure firms’ liquidity. The aim is to forestall a situation whereby a specific 
proportion of such firms, including those most indebted and those that are least 
profitable, should not manage to survive the shutdown, which would give rise to 
more persistent effects on investment and employment. In this respect, the data 
available show a steep decline of 8.2% in the number of firms with Social Security 
contributory accounts (i.e. with employees on their payroll) in March (see Chart 5.2). 
The deregistrations in this statistic do not necessarily mean the permanent 
disappearance of the firms, since it cannot be ruled out that they may resume their 
activity in the future. However, the longer the crisis goes on, the greater the probability 
of these companies that currently do not have employees registered ultimately 
closing for good.
It is highly likely that inflation, measured by the rate of change of the HICP, will 
undergo a pronounced decline this year as a result of the strongly negative 
contribution of the energy component, in turn the outcome of the fall in oil prices 
both on spot and futures markets. As to the CPI excluding fresh food and energy 
prices, the combination of shocks associated with COVID-19 entails a series of 
supply- and demand-side elements that exert opposing pressures on the trajectory 
of prices. The force of the demand-side elements is so great that disinflationary 
forces may be expected to prevail. In any event, the expected downward trajectory 
of the aggregate indicator of core inflation is compatible with the possibility of 
significant changes arising in relative prices. Specifically, the shutdown in 
accommodation and food service activities and the foreseeably slow recovery in 
tourist activities might give rise to an easing in the rate of change of the prices of 
these services. Conversely, in a setting in which the emergence of isolated food 
supply difficulties cannot be ruled out, some food prices might rise to some extent. 
In sum, the macroeconomic scenarios for the Spanish economy set out here suggest, 
with a very high degree of probability, that the epidemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 
coronavirus will entail very severe economic consequences; the contraction in GDP 
in 2020 will far exceed that witnessed in any of the years of the global financial crisis. 
In any event, the scenarios are preliminary in nature and subject to what may be 
potentially significant subsequent revisions, depending on how developments 
unfold. 
20.4.2020.
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In the current circumstances, in which the statistical 
information available has barely begun to reflect the 
consequences of the measures taken to control the 
pandemic, direct contacts with economic agents are a 
very valuable source of information. Given this situation, 
the Banco de España has participated in two initiatives 
consisting in the conduct of surveys to collect information 
on the impact of COVID-19 on the business sector. The 
first one was carried out in collaboration with the Instituto 
de Empresa Familiar (Institute of Family-owned 
Businesses, IEF) and its regional associations, and was 
addressed to 455 family-owned businesses throughout 
Spain. The second was a survey designed exclusively by 
the Banco de España, which enables responses to be 
segmented in accordance with the characteristics of the 
firms, such as their size and sector of activity, the main 
conclusions of which are the subject of this box. The 
results of these two surveys broadly coincide. 
The survey conducted by the Banco de España on its 
own, like the one conducted in collaboration with the IEF, 
provides highly useful qualitative information on various 
aspects of interest, such as the effects of the health crisis 
and the pandemic containment measures on the activity 
of the various sectors of the economy, the strategies that 
firms have implemented in response, their future 
expectations and their perception of the effectiveness of 
the economic policy measures taken. A short survey was 
designed to shed light on these issues. On 3 April it was 
sent to 133 businesses that regularly report data to the 
Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Date Office, for 
whose participation we are grateful. The information 
presented in this box is based on the valid 88 responses 
that had been received by 8 April. Although the small size 
of the sample limits its statistical representativeness, the 
businesses were selected so as to include companies of 
different sizes and sectors in order to give the most 
accurate picture possible of the impact of the crisis on 
Spanish businesses. The average size of the firms 
included in the final sample is relatively large, with a 
median of 241 employees, although 10.3% of the firms 
have fewer than 50 workers and 42.5% between 50 and 
249. In terms of its sectoral composition, 4.6% of the 
businesses belong to the primary sector, 43.7% to 
industry (including manufacturing (23%), energy and 
water supply (18.4%) and construction (2.3%)), while the 
remaining 51.7% are in the services sector (trade (13.8%), 
transport and accommodation and food service activities 
(8%), information and communications and real estate 
activities (6.9%), professional, scientific and technical 
activities (14.9%) and other services (8%)).
The information obtained from the sample shows the 
strength of the impact of the shock. Almost 80% of the 
firms surveyed report a reduction in their activity as a 
consequence of the health crisis, while somewhat more 
than 9% reported an increase (see Chart 1). Among the 
companies that report having seen a fall in turnover, the 
reductions are very large, exceeding 60% in almost four 
of every ten responses received. The decline in activity is 
broad-based across sectors and firm sizes, although it is 
more marked in the case of firms in the services sector, 
which is consistent with the fact that the consequences of 
the restrictions on activity associated with the declaration 
of the state of alert have been especially severe in many 
of these industries.1 
When businesses are asked to give the reasons for the 
decline in activity, the fall in demand proves to be the main 
cause (see Chart 2). Specifically, more than half of the 
non-financial corporations surveyed report that this factor 
has had a major or very major impact on their activity, this 
proportion being relatively higher in the case of services 
firms. Among other reasons, the compulsory stoppage of 
the activities of some industries as a result of the 
declaration of the state of alert plays a similarly important 
role to the fall in demand. In addition, around one fifth of 
the firms surveyed report having been affected by 
difficulties in obtaining supplies from their usual suppliers, 
and a similar proportion mention obstacles to obtaining 
payment from customers. In the case of the supply 
difficulties, the impact is comparatively greater among 
industrial firms, reflecting the disruption to production 
chains, at home and abroad, partly as a result of closures 
and transport problems. Finally, the obstacles to raising 
financing and lack of liquidity are cited by a relatively 
small proportion of firms, although the smallest firms do 
report particular concern in this area, reflecting their 
greater vulnerability to these factors.
The survey also asks firms about the different strategies 
adopted to address the crisis (see Chart 3). The use of 
telework appears to be the main plank of firms’ 
Box 1
BUSINESS SURVEY ON THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS
1  The magnitude of the crisis appears to be smaller in the case of the firms surveyed that belong to the primary sector. However, it was decided not to 
carry out a detailed analysis of the results for this industry, given that the size of the sample is very small in this case.
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Box 1
BUSINESS SURVEY ON THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España survey on the impact of Covid-19.
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response to the mobility restrictions affecting their 
workforces and to their concern for the health of their 
employees. Specifically, 80% of the non-financial 
corporations surveyed state that this tool has been 
important or very important in their reaction to the 
crisis, irrespective of whether or not their activity has 
been adversely affected by the latter. This extensive 
use of telework has probably avoided an even larger 
decline in business activity. 
In contrast, production cost adjustment strategies have 
been used especially by firms whose activity has been hit 
by the crisis. Specifically, these companies have tended 
to contain their labour costs by means of temporary 
layoffs (Expedientes de Regulación Temporal de Empleo, 
ERTEs) and the suspension of new hiring. The latter, 
along with the low level of dismissals, is generally 
consistent with the behaviour of Social Security 
registrations in the second half of March. However, firms 
whose activity has been reduced by the crisis report 
having made hardly any use of non-renewal of temporary 
contracts, in contrast to the major destruction of 
temporary employment observed in the registrations 
statistic. Also, little use appears to have been made of 
wage adjustment. Moreover, adaptation to the crisis has 
included the suspension of investments already planned 
and the reduction of other non-labour costs, these 
strategies being cited by 50% and 40%, respectively, of 
those firms that have seen a fall in activity. 
By industry, the relative importance of the various 
channels for addressing the crisis is similar, although 
services firms report greater use of the channels for 
reducing their labour and non-labour costs, which would 
be consistent with the greater extent of the reported fall in 
their activity (see Chart 4).2
An additional section of the survey requests information 
on firms’ perception of the degree of usefulness of the 
economic policy measures already adopted and of others 
that may be approved shortly (see Chart 5). More than half 
of the firms surveyed consider that the tax deferral 
measures are important or very important. As is to be 
expected, this percentage is higher (exceeding 70%) 
among firms whose activity has fallen in this period, given 
their greater need for liquidity. Also, a high proportion of 
firms believes that the measures facilitating ERTEs (almost 
50%), granting public guarantees for loans, and ICO credit 
facilities (around one third in both cases) are useful. In 
terms of firm size, the smallest, who report greater liquidity 
concerns, perceive the ICO’s guarantee and loan 
instruments to be more useful than large companies do.
Finally, the participating businesses expressed their 
concern regarding the lasting impact that the crisis may 
have on their activity when the mobility restrictions are 
lifted. Specifically, around two-thirds of the firms surveyed 
expect their level of activity to be lower than before the 
epidemic reached Spain (see Chart 6). These expectations 
are directly related to perceptions of the current impact of 
the crisis; for firms that have already experienced a 
decline in activity this percentage exceeded 75%, while 
for those reporting that they have been unaffected it is 
less than 30%.
Box 1
BUSINESS SURVEY ON THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS (cont’d)
2  This chart includes all the firms of each industry, whether or not they have reduced their activity.
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The health crisis caused by COVID-19 and the measures 
to contain its spread are severely disrupting global 
economic activity. This box illustrates the potential 
adverse effects on the main global economic areas by 
means of several simulation scenarios. These assume 
that the direct impact of the health crisis is confined 
essentially to the first half of this year, for the reasons set 
out in the second section of the main body of the text. 
For China, the first country affected, there is evidence that 
consumption, industry and services were severely struck 
at the peak of the health crisis: industrial production, retail 
sales and investment fell by close to 20% year-on-year in 
the January-February period. As from March, the 
progressive lifting of the containment measures, alongside 
resolute stimulus measures, is estimated to be paving the 
way for an incipient recovery in activity, according to the 
partial data available. 
In the rest of the economies affected by the pandemic, 
evidence on the scale of the negative shock is still scant 
(see Chart 1), since infections began to escalate in late 
February and the harshest containment measures were 
introduced in March. In any event, as observed previously 
in China, the impact of COVID-19 is becoming manifest in 
a highly pronounced downturn in consumption and 
tourism – in terms of demand components – and in 
passenger transport, leisure activities and other related 
services, in respect of productive sectors. The overall 
weight of these sectors in activity is high (see Chart 2). 
The consequences of the health crisis have also markedly 
affected the financial and commodities markets. The 
initial impact on commodities (oil and industrial metals) 
prices of the contraction in Chinese demand has 
progressively increased as the epidemic has spread to 
other economies that consume these goods (see Chart 3). 
Moreover, the consequences of the epidemic are 
prompting a very sharp increase in risk aversion on 
international financial markets, with heavy falls on stock 
markets, higher risk premia and a flight to safe-haven 
assets (see Chart 4). 
What the ultimate extent of the disruption caused by this 
episode may be is highly uncertain at present, in a setting 
in which several different economic shocks are 
simultaneously in play. First, the standstill imposed on 
production is bearing down negatively on supply. 
Amplifying this phenomenon is the high degree of 
integration of the manufacturing sector globally, and this 
may exert persistent effects on potential output. Second, 
reflecting the sharp contraction in demand are lower 
household consumption and a fall-off in business 
investment. Third, the global financial shock may also 
ultimately impact consumption and investment decisions, 
in particular through its adverse effects on financing 
conditions and on agents’ wealth. Fourth, the decline in 
commodities prices harms the countries producing these 
goods. Lastly, uncertainty over the outlook may reduce 
consumer and investment spending beyond the health 
crisis horizon, leading to the destruction of firms and jobs, 
to an increase in defaults and to the tightening of financing 
conditions for certain agents. That may prompt a vicious 
circle or “doom loop”, and embed the crisis more deeply. 
To illustrate what possible scale of influence the pandemic 
may exert and how the containment measures could 
affect economic activity, the results of a set of simulations 
made using NiGEM, a global macroeconometric model1, 
are set out below. These international scenarios do not 
solely share the main assumptions considered in the 
scenarios for the Spanish economy described in Section 
5 of this article; they also provide the external demand 
ingredient that is used in these exercises.2 NiGEM has a 
simplified framework that captures mainly the channels 
operating through domestic demand, tourism, the effects 
of financial variables and commodities prices; however, it 
also incorporates in a partial fashion some supply-side 
effects. As regards economic policies, these are assumed 
in the simulations to react in accordance with the habitual 
historical patterns.3 
Three hypothetical scenarios, dubbed “limited”, 
“persistent” and “prolonged confinement”, are considered. 
Box 2
GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE HEALTH CRISIS
1  The documentation for the model, whose owner is the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, is available at https://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/. 
2  The NiGEM and the MTBE model used to simulate the scenarios for the Spanish economy in the main body of the text are semi-structural models 
with many elements in common. But they also show some differences, linked to the different purposes for which both tools have been developed. 
Whereas the first model prioritises interrelations between the different economies, in light of its global nature, the second is geared to capturing in much 
greater detail the macroeconomic relationships of the Spanish economy. However, the results with both models for the Spanish GDP growth path 
shown relatively small differences in whichever of the three scenarios are taken. 
3  Specifically, monetary policy is considered to be endogenous in accordance with a “Taylor rule” (and the non-conventional measures make up for the 
negative nominal rates constraint), and fiscal policy acts as an automatic stabiliser (maintaining, at the same time, a medium-term budget balance 
target). 
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Box 2
GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE HEALTH CRISIS (cont’d)
SOURCES: World Bank, IMF, IFS, IHS, ISM, Markit and Banco de España calculations.
a The index used is the ISM index.
b The pre-Covid forecasts considered are those of the IMF published in the January 2020 WEO Update.
c Sum of the impact of the channels taken individually and the composition effect (interaction between channels).
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GLOBAL IMPACT OF THE HEALTH CRISIS IN 2020
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Box 2
GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE HEALTH CRISIS (cont’d)
They differ in terms of the assumed duration of the period 
of confinement, the speed at which demand is assumed 
to recover and the possibility that global financial 
conditions may tighten. The technical assumptions of the 
exercise are detailed in Table 1. In these scenarios it is 
assumed that the crisis affects the main world economies 
and that the direct adverse effects of the pandemic are 
confined, as stated above, to the first half of this year. In 
the first two scenarios, it is considered that the confinement 
being applied at present in a very extensive number of 
countries will have a total duration of eight weeks; in the 
case of the “prolonged confinement” scenario, the harsher 
containment measures will run for up to 12 weeks. As to 
the speed of the recovery, the “limited” scenario considers 
a more dynamic profile for activity, on account of the rise 
in consumer durables purchases that were postponed, 
while the other two scenarios incorporate additional 
adverse effects. The latter stem from the possibility that 
the initial decline may ultimately last longer owing to a 
potential tightening of financial conditions, which would 
make some of the contractionary elements of the 
pandemic more durable. 
The size of the shocks applied to the scenarios is 
calibrated using the data available as at the cut-off date 
for this report on the reduction in activity in China in Q1 
and the declines observed in financial and commodities 
markets, along with the observed course of potential 
output following the global financial crisis that broke in 
2008. 
According to the simulations conducted, compared with 
what was expected before the pandemic became 
widespread4, global growth is estimated to decline by 
around 7 pp, 9 pp and 11 pp in 2020 in the limited, 
persistent and prolonged confinement scenarios, 
respectively. Global economic growth is thereby expected 
SOURCE: Devised by authors.
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Scenario 1 
Limited
–10% during the three months 
following the imposition of 
containment measures, 40% of 
the shock is recovered in the 
following quarter
Financial
markets
–25% in Q2; rapidly returns 
to prior levels
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Scenario 2
Persistent
Scenario 3 
Prolonged confinement
 +250 bp in Q2; returns to prior levels very slowly+250 bp in Q2; rapidly returns 
to prior levels
Change in Brent crude prices implict in the futures curve
–10% during the three months 
following the imposition of 
containment measures, domestic 
demand recovers slowly
–15% during the three months 
following the imposition of 
containment measures, domestic 
demand recovers slowly
Potential GDP is further affected by a financial crisis
–100% in 2020 Q2 and gradual recovery to 2021 Q3
–25% in Q2; returns to prior levels very slowly
Table 1
SCENARIO CALIBRATION
4  The IMF’s forecasts in its January 2020 WEO report are taken as a reference.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 ECONOMIC BULLETIN  REFERENCE MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY AFTER COVID-19
to post negative figures of -3.5%, -5.4% and -7.8%, 
respectively, en 2020 (see Chart 5). By geographical area, 
the United States will see an adverse impact on growth of 
7.3 pp, 9.7 pp and 12.8 pp in each of the three scenarios, 
respectively, slightly above the effects obtained for the 
euro area.5 These are, specifically, -6.8 pp, -8.7 pp and 
-11.2 pp, in each of the three scenarios, giving rise to 
growth rates of -5.5%, -7.4% and -9.9%6. The size of the 
fall-off in Chinese output would be 6.5 pp, 8.4 pp and 10.7 
pp. Generally, the most unfavourable channel is that 
associated with the fall in domestic demand, followed by 
the collapse of the tourism sector. Given the temporary 
nature of the health crisis, the main economic areas are 
expected to begin to recover as from the second half of 
this year, meaning that the global economy would post 
significant increases in output in 2021. Nonetheless, the 
cumulative loss of worldwide income between 2020 and 
2021 will be somewhat less than 10% and somewhat over 
15% of the level expected before the pandemic, with 
these figures relating respectively to the “limited” and 
“prolonged confinement” scenarios (see Chart 6).
The meagre information available on activity in the current 
economic circumstances, the speed of events and the 
lack of comparable episodes in recent decades mean the 
simulations are subject to an unusually high level of 
uncertainty, as is explained in the main body of the article. 
The duration of the pandemic and the implications of the 
containment measures for the economy in the medium 
term are particularly uncertain. Should it extend beyond 
the period considered in these exercises, the adverse 
impact on the global economy might be even more 
serious. Against this background, a robust and coordinated 
economic policy reaction such as that being deployed is 
necessary in order to soften the negative effect on 
households and firms and to bring the economy back as 
soon as possible onto a path of sustained growth and job 
creation. 
Box 2
GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE HEALTH CRISIS (cont’d)
5  The relatively more marked decline in the United States would be on account of a greater weight of private consumption, owing to the greater 
weakness of the automatic stabilisers and to a greater incidence of the financial shock than in the euro area. Conversely, in the latest WEO, the adverse 
effects are somewhat lower in the case of the United States. While details on the assumptions underlying the IMF forecasts are not provided, part of 
the discrepancy is likely to be due to the fact that these projections were prepared at an earlier time, when the spread of the epidemic in the US 
economy was far less than at present.
6  To make these rates for the euro area economy comparable with those presented for Spain in the main body of the report it is necessary to make a 
technical adjustment in the former, which would give rise to rates of -5.9%, -8.5% and -11.1%, respectively, in each scenario, in 2020.
